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Abstract-In the context of security protocol parallel compo-
sition, where messages belonging to different protocols can 
intersect each other, we introduce a new paradigm: term-
based composition (i.e. the composition of message compo-
nents also known as terms). First, we create a protocol speci-
fication model by extending the original strand spaces. Then, 
we provide a term composition algorithm based on which 
new terms can be constructed. To ensure that security prop-
erties are maintained, we introduce the concept of term con-
nections to express the existing connections between terms 
and encryption contexts. We illustrate the proposed composi-
tion process by using two existing protocols. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Security protocols are communication protocols in 
which participants use encryption to send each other en-
coded information. With the rapid growth of the Internet 
and a desperate need to secure communication, in the last 
few decades the attention of many researchers has been led 
towards the analysis of security protocols [1], [2], [3], [4], 
[5], [6]. 
Recently, there have been several proposals developed 
to help the process of security protocol design using for-
mal methods and tools [7], [8], [9], [10], [11], [12], [13]. 
Most of the proposed techniques use a modular approach 
in the design process, where the user is given a set of small 
protocols from which more complex protocols can be con-
structed, process also known as composition [9], [10], 
[11]. 
In the existing composition techniques, authors mainly 
deal with the sequential and parallel composition of secu-
rity properties viewed as a set of information transmitted 
over messages. However, the composition of message 
components has not been addressed in a proper manner, 
meaning that users have to solve the problem of creating 
new messages on their own. 
Solving this problem, apparently insignificant, can lead 
to protocols which execute in half the time the original, 
composed protocols do. In addition, the composition proc-
ess can lead to multiple results, which must be carefully 
analyzed on a message level to increase protocol perform-
ance. 
In this paper, we introduce a novel composition para-
digm: term-based composition. The composition problem 
is addressed at the message level based on syntactical con-
structions and analysis. This new paradigm is addressed in 
the context of parallel composition, where protocol mes-
sages intersect each other. The resulting protocol contains 
not only a set of unified messages but also a unified set of 
security properties (e.g. secrecy, authentication, integrity). 
The paper is structured as follows. Section II introduces 
the concept of k-strands used to model security protocols. 
Security requirements are addressed in section III. In sec-
tion IV we present the problem of generating protocols 
using parallel composition and term-based composition 
and we propose a term composition algorithm. We exem-
plify the composition process by composing two protocols. 
II. KNOWLEDGE STRANDS 
In this section we briefly present the concept of knowl-
edge strands (k-strands). For a more detailed presentation, 
the reader is directed to consult the authors’ previous work 
[6], [17]. 
A strand is a sequence of transmission and reception 
events used to model protocol participants. A collection of 
strands is called a strand space. The strand space model 
was introduced by Fabrega, Herzog and Guttman in [15] 
and extended by the authors with participant knowledge, 
specialized basic sets and explicit term construction in [5], 
[6]. The resulting model is called a k-strand space. The 
rest of this section formally defines the k-strand and k-
strand space concepts.  
By analyzing the protocol specifications from the 
SPORE library [20] we can conclude that protocol partici-
pants communicate by exchanging terms constructed from 
elements belonging to the following sets: R, denoting the 
set of participant names; N, denoting the set of nonces (i.e. 
“number once used”) and K, denoting the set of crypto-
graphic keys. If required, other sets can be easily added 
without affecting the other components. 
To denote the encryption type used to create crypto-
graphic terms, we define the following function names: 
 FuncName ::=  sk  (secret key)    (1) 
          | pk  (public key) 
          | pvk (private key) 
          | h    (hash). 
 
The above-defined basic sets and function names are 
used in the definition of terms, where we also introduce 
constructors for pairing and encryption: 
      ( ) { } ( ):: . | | | | , | FuncName= TT T T TR N K ,    (2) 
where the ‘.’ symbol is used to denote an empty term. We 
use the symbol ∗T to denote the set of all subsets of terms. 
 The composition process of two terms t1 and t2 into an-
other term t implies that t has sub-terms. The sub-term 
relation ≺  is inductively defined as follows. 
Definition 1. The sub-term relation ≺  is the smallest rela-
tion on terms such that: 
1. t t≺ ; 
2. { } ( )21 f tt t≺  if  1t t≺  or 2t t≺ ; 
3. ( )1 2,t t t≺  if  1t t≺  or 2t t≺ . 
 
Before defining the concept of knowledge strands we 
need to define another element: classifiers. As suggested 
by their names, classifiers are used to classify or catego-
rize knowledge strands. The categories are created based 
on the type of operation modeled by a given knowledge 
strand. Formally, classifiers are defined as: 
( )
( )
::
|
Participant classifier
Memory classifier
=
R
M
C C
C
. 
To denote the transmission and reception of terms, we 
use signed terms. The occurrence of a term with a positive 
sign denotes transmission, while the occurrence of a term 
with a negative sign denotes reception. The set of trans-
mission and reception sequences is denoted by ( )∗±T . 
Definition 2. A k-strand (i.e. knowledge strand) is a tuple 
, , ,r sK c , where ∗∈K T denotes the knowledge corre-
sponding to the modeled participant, ∈c C  denotes the 
classifier, r ∈R  denotes the participant name and 
( )s ∗∈ ±T denotes the sequence of transmissions and re-
ceptions. A set of k-strands is called a k-strand space. The 
set of all k-strand spaces is denoted by kΣ . Let kς  be a k-
strand space and k ks ς∈  a k-strand, then: 
1. We define the following mapping functions: 
( )kkknow s  to map the knowledge component; 
( )kkclass s  to map the classifier component; 
( )kkpart s  to map the name component; 
( )kkstrand s  to map the term sequence component; 
2. A node is any transmission or reception of a term, 
written as ( ) ,kn kstrand s i= , where i is an inte-
ger satisfying the condition ( )1 i length s≤ ≤ . We 
define the ( )term n function to map the term corre-
sponding to a given node; 
3. Let ( )1 ,kn kstrand s i=  and 
( )2 , 1kn kstrand s i= +  be two consecutive nodes 
from the same k-strand. Then, there exists an edge 
1 2n n⇒  in the same k-strand; 
4. Let 1 2,n n  be two nodes. If 1n  is a positive node and 
1n  is a negative node belonging to different k-
strands, then there exists an edge 1 2n n→ . We de-
fine the ( )sign n  function to map the sign of a given 
node. 
Fig. 1 shows an example specification of Lowe’s BAN 
Concrete Secure RPC [14] protocol in the described k-
strand space model. 
III. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS 
The composition of security protocols can not be made 
by simply adding messages to one protocol. By inspecting 
the rather large number of reported attacks in the literature 
[14], [18], [20] we can agree that any modification brought 
upon a protocol can influence its existing security proper-
ties. Based on these concerns, the authors have developed 
in a previous paper [17] a framework for verifying the 
composability of security protocols. 
The method developed by the authors requires the exe-
cution of two steps. First, we must verify if secret terms 
from one protocol can be found in insecure terms in the 
other protocol. By the concept insecure we mean terms 
encrypted with insecure keys (e.g. session keys) or terms 
that are sent out clearly. Second, we must verify if terms 
encrypted with the same key are structurally independent. 
In other words, we must verify if participants, based on 
term structures and knowledge can distinguish between the 
given terms. 
The first requirement is fulfilled by conducting a syntac-
tical verification of the given protocol terms. The protocol 
model used is the one presented in the previous section. 
Alongside the specification, the user has to provide the 
terms considered to be secret for each protocol. 
For the second requirement to be fulfilled we must con-
struct the canonical specification model proposed by the 
authors in the same paper. This model eliminates instantia-
tion-based information (e.g. Na, A, B, Kab), leaving only 
essential information needed in the structural independ-
ence verification process (e.g. n, r, r, k). 
IV. COMPOSITION 
A.  Generating protocols 
By using parallel composition, we can produce several 
distinct protocols. For example, given two protocols, P1 
and P2, each of them with two messages, the protocols that 
can be constructed are listed in Table 1, where P1.i and 
P2.j, { }i, j 1, 2∈ , denote message indexes corresponding to 
the two protocols and Px.i,Py.j, { }x, y 1,2∈  denotes con-
catenation. 
 
TABLE I 
PROTOCOL AND MESSAGE SEQUENCES GENERATED 
USING PARALLEL MESSAGE COMPOSITION 
Without term 
composition 
With term 
composition 
P1.1 
P1.2 
P2.1 
P2.2 
P1.1 
P2.1 
P1.2 
P2.2 
P2.1, P1.1 
P1.2 
P2.2 
P1.1 
P2.1, P1.2 
P2.2 
P2.1 
P1.1 
P2.2 
P1.2 
P1.1 
P2.1 
P2.2 
P1.2 
P2.1, P1.1 
P2.2, P1.2 
P1.1 
P2.1 
P2.2, P1.2 
P2.1 
P2.2 
P1.1 
P1.2 
P2.1 
P1.1 
P1.2 
P2.2 
P2.1 
P1.1 
P2.2, P1.2 
P2.1, P1.1 
P2.2 
P1.2 
- - 
P2.1 
P2.2, P1.1 
P1.2 
- 
 
(3) 
  
            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Lowe’s BAN Concrete Andrew  
Secure RPC representation in the k-strand space model 
 
More formally, given two protocols modeled in the k-
strand space, ,k k kς ς ′ ∈ Σ , we generate new protocols using 
operations such as message intercalation and term 
concatenation. Message intercalation denotes the process 
by which several messages belonging to different 
protocols are combined together maintainig at the same 
time their original order of appearance. On the other hand, 
term concatenation simply concatenates two terms without 
performing any optimisations on the resulting term. 
The generated protocols are denoted by the set 
GenProtPairs. Each element of this set contains a 
sequence of term pairs ,i jx y , where the first component 
denotes terms transmitted in the first protocol and the 
second component denotes terms transmitted in the second 
protocol. More formally, ix ∈ ( )ksentTerms ς , jy ∈  
( )ksentTerms ς ′ , ( )1, ki sentTerms ς= , j =  
( )1, ksentTerms ς ′ , where : ksentTerms ∗Σ → T  is a func-
tion mapping the set of sent terms in a given protocol 
specification,  defined as: 
( ) ( )
( )( )
( ) ( )
{}
1, ,
, ,
.
k k k
i k i
k i
s i length kstrand s
n kstrand s i sign n
sentTerms term n
ς
ς
∈ =
= =+
 
  
= ∪ 
 
  
∪ ∪ .    (4) 
This function also mapps empty components, denoted 
by ‘.’ to model sittuations where the second operation (i.e. 
term concatenation) is not applied. 
As a final step for the protocol generation process, we 
must check that concatenated messages have the same 
source and destination participants. If we find at least one 
message that does not satisfy this requirement, the entire 
protocol is removed from the list. 
B. Security property definition 
The term composition process constructs all possible 
combinations of terms using two given terms by modify-
ing existing terms. In the context of security protocols, 
these combinations must not destroy existing security 
properties. In order to provide a correct composition we 
must define the concept of a security property. 
Because security protocols consist of participants ex-
changing terms, security properties are created by the 
transmitted and received terms. More specifically, it is the 
cryptographic context of each term in conjunction with the 
exchange of terms from which security properties are con-
structed. To formally define security properties we intro-
duce two new concepts: partial and complete term connec-
tion. Connections between terms denote the existence of a 
set of common terms. Partial connections denote the con-
nections between a free (i.e. unencrypted) term and an 
encrypted one while complete connections denote the con-
nections between two encrypted terms. 
To express the existence of a partial and a complete 
connection we introduce two operators, 
( ) ( )_ _ :P k k± × × Σ × ± × × Σ T T T T  and 
( ) ( )_ _ :C k k± × × Σ × ± × × Σ T T T T  respectively. 
These operators denote the connection between one node, 
term and k-strand to another node, term and k-strand. The 
first component of these operators is called a pre-condition 
and the second is called a post-condition. We define the 
following functions, cnode, cterm, cstrand to map the 
node, term and k-strand corresponding to a pre-condition 
or post-condition. 
We say that there is a partial connection between two 
terms 1t  and 2t , if 1t is a sub-term of 2t , 1t  is not en-
crypted and 2t  has a cryptographic construction or vice-
versa. Formally, 
1 1 1 2 2 2, , , ,k P kn t s n t s  if 1 2t t≺ , where      (5) 
  
{ } ( ) { } ( )( )
{ } ( ) { } ( )( )
1 1 2 2
1 1 2 2
f t f t
f t f t
t t t t
t t t t
′ ′≠ ∧ = ∨
′ ′= ∧ ≠
, 
  ( )1 1t term n≺ , ( )1 1t term n≺ ,  
  ( )( ){ }1 11i kn n i length kstrand s∈ ≤ ≤ , 
  ( )( ){ }2 21i kn n i length kstrand s∈ ≤ ≤ . 
A complete connection between two terms, 1t  and 2t ,  
exists only if 1t  is an encrypted sub-term of 2t  and 2t  has 
a cryptographic construction or the non-cryptographic 
component of 1t  is a sub-term of 2t . Formally, 
1 1 1 2 2 2, , , ,k C kn t s n t s  if 1 2t t≺  or 1 2t t′ ≺ , where     (6) 
  { } ( )1 1 f tt t ′= , { } ( )2 2 f tt t′= , 
  ( )1 1t term n≺ , ( )1 1t term n≺ ,  
  ( )( ){ }1 11i kn n i length kstrand s∈ ≤ ≤ , 
  ( )( ){ }2 21i kn n i length kstrand s∈ ≤ ≤ . 
 
Definition 3. A security property ξ  is a collection of par-
tial and complete connections. 
 
By the definition given above, a security property is a 
set of connections between terms. This definition is similar 
to the definition of authenticaton tests given by Guttman in 
[10]. The difference is that we define connections not only 
between terms transmitted by different nodes, but also 
between sub-terms. This allows us to define complex 
security properties such as authentication, but also other, 
more subtle ones such as secrecy. 
By using term connections we can model dependencies 
between terms. This key aspect is vital in the process of 
term composition because by modifying one term we must 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
{ }, , , ,a ABA A B N K  { }, , , , ,b ABB B A N K K  
, aA N  
{ } ( ), , ABa sk KN K B  
{ } ( )a sk KN  
bN  
 also modify other, dependent terms to maintain existing 
security properties. 
C. Modeling dynamic knowledge 
As opposed to the static (i.e. initial) knowledge, there is 
another type of knowledge that can be constructed by pro-
tocol participants: dynamic knowledge. This type of 
knowledge grows with every term that is received. Dy-
namic knowledge is modeled as a k-strand that “communi-
cates” with the participant’s k-strand using term transmis-
sions and receptions.  
Participants are modeled as a pair of k-strands consist-
ing of one main, participant k-strand and a memory k-
strand, modeling dynamic knowledge. In the composition 
process, terms can be modified. For example, they can be 
included in cryptographic context that can not be created 
by a participant because at the given node cryptographic 
keys have not yet been received. By modeling dynamic 
knowledge, we are able to decide if the terms that must be 
transmitted by a node can be constructed. 
In order to provide a persistent model of the dynamic 
knowledge, we consider that terms from this knowledge 
are stored in a memory region that can only be accessed by 
the corresponding participant. This memory region, as 
mentioned earlier, is modeled as a k-strand. However, be-
cause communication between each participant and its 
attached memory must be private, we consider an en-
crypted communication model using a new function type 
mk and a key. The function is the same, while the key is 
unique for each user. 
Next, we propose an algorithm for creating memory k-
strands, identified by the class
M
C . Given an initial k-
strand ks , that models the operations corresponding to a 
participant, by running the algorithm, we generate two 
new k-strands, a participant k-strand ks′  and a memory k-
strand ks′′ . The newly generated participant k-strand addi-
tionally contains nodes modeling communication with the 
attached memory k-strand. 
Receiving a term from the memory k-strand corre-
sponds to the dynamic knowledge. The terms received by 
memory k-strands are decoded, transformed into new 
knowledge and added to the existing knowledge. 
The proposed algorithm makes use of the 
:genKnow × →T T T  function to generate new knowl-
edge based on existing knowledge (stored as a term) and a 
new received term. 
 
Algorithm 1. Memory k-strand generation: 
1. Generate memory communication encryption key 
mK  
2. Initialize the new k-strands: 
( ){ }, , , .k k ms kknow s K r′ = ∪ RC  
( ){ }, , , .k k ms kknow s K r′′ = ∪ MC  
2. For every positive node ( ) ,kn kstrand s i=  add a 
positive node to ks′ : 
( ) ( ), , , ,k k ks kknow s r kstrand s n′ ′ ′= RC  
3. For every negative node ( ) ,kn kstrand s i=  add a 
negative node to ks′  and generate new knowledge: 
( ) ( ) ( ){ } ( ), , , , , mk k k mk Ks kknow s r kstrand s n term n′ ′ ′= +RC
( ) ( ) ( ){ } ( ), , , , mk k k mk Ks kknow s r kstrand s term n′′ ′′ ′′= −MC  
Let n′ be the last positive node from ks′′  
Let ( )kkknow s′ ′=K  and ( )kkknow s′′ ′′=K  
Let ( ) ( )( ),knowt genKnow term n term n′=  
( ) { } ( ), , , , mk k know mk Ks r kstrand s t′ ′ ′= −RK C  
( ) { } ( ), , , , mk k know mk Ks r kstrand s t′′ ′′ ′′= +MK C  
D. Term composition algorithm 
In the protocol generation process described at section 
A, terms that are concatenated must be composed in order 
to generate more performant protocols. The composition 
process can alter terms, maintaining at the same time exist-
ing security properties. 
First, we construct the connection sequences between 
protocol terms for the involved protocols. Then, we initial-
ize a new k-strand space by creating k-strands correspond-
ing to participants. The initialization process also creates 
unified static knowledge sets for every participant. 
Next, for every pair of concatenated terms resulted in 
the protocol generation phase we run the composition al-
gorithm. By modifying one term we must ensure that the 
terms from the connection sequence are also modified. We 
ensure that partial connections are maintained by not 
modifying the cryptographic context of terms. Maintaining 
complete connections, however, requires a subsequent 
modification of dependent terms. 
After performing each term composition, the memory k-
strand algorithm from section C is run to construct the 
memory k-strands. Then, for every term transmitted by a 
participant k-strand we use the :Constructable ∗× ×T T T  
predicate to verify if the transmitted term can be con-
structed from the existing static and dynamic knowledge. 
For two concatenated terms ( )1 2,t t , ( )1 kt sentTerms ς ′∈ , 
( )2 kt sentTerms ς ′′∈ , the composition algorithm is the fol-
lowing. 
 
Algorithm 2. Composition: 
1. Construct connection sequences as security properties: 
Let { }1 1 1 , 2 2 2 1 1, , , , , ,k C P k k k kn t s n t s s sξ ς′ ′= ∈   
Let { }1 1 1 , 2 2 2 1 1, , , , , ,k C P k k k kn t s n t s s sξ ς′′ ′′= ∈   
2. Initialize new k-strand space: 
Let kς be the resulting k-strand space 
For each k k ks ς ς′ ′ ′′∈ ∪  do 
If ( ) ( )( ),k k k ks krole s krole sς ′∀ ∈ <>  then 
Let ( ) ( ), , , .k k ks kknow s krole s= RC  
{ }k k ksς ς= ∪  
Else 
Let ( ) ( ):k k k ks krole s krole sς ′∈ = and  
  , , ,ks r c s= K
 
 ( ){ }, , ,k ks kknow s r c s′= ∪K  
EndIf 
EndFor 
3. Compose two terms: 
Let { } ( )1 11 1 f kt t′= , { } ( )2 22 2 f kt t′= ,  
      ( ) ( )1 1 2 2,t term n t term n≺ ≺  
If 1 2 1 2f f k k= ∧ = then 
   If ( ) ( ) ( )( )1 2 2 1 2 1:Cc c cterm c t cnode c nξ ′ ′∃ ∈ = ∧ =/   
                    ( ) ( )( )1 1 1 1cterm c t cnode c n′∨ = ∧ =  then 
     { } ( )1 11 1 2, f kt t t′ ′′=  
  Else 
   If ( )1 2 :Cc c ξ ′∃ ∈/   
 ( ) ( )( )1 1 1 1cterm c t cnode c n′= ∧ =  then 
 { } ( )1 11 1 2, f kt t t′ ′′=  
 @update term connection sequence 
  EndIf 
Else 
  { } ( )1 11 1 2, f kt t t′=  
  @update term connection sequence 
EndIf 
4. Generate memory k-strands 
@run Algorithm 1 to construct kς  initialized at step 2 
5. Verify term generation 
Let ( ) ( ), :k k k k ks s kclass s kclass sς′ ′∈ = ∧ = ∧R MC C  
  ( ) ( )k kkpart s kpart s′=  
Let n , n′  be the last positive node from ks  and ks′ re-
spectively 
If ( ) ( ) ( )( ), ,kConstructable term n kknow s term n′ then 
 @Accept kς  
Else 
 @Reject kς  
EndIf 
V. COMPOSITION EXAMPLE 
To illustrate the composition process we use two proto-
cols: “Woo and Lam Pi3” [16] and Lowe’s modified ver-
sion of the Yahalom [18, 19] protocol. The k-strand repre-
sentation of the two protocols can be seen in Fig. 2 and 
Fig. 3. We use kς to model the k-strand space correspond-
ing to the “Woo and Lam Pi3” and kς ′ to model the k-
strand space corresponding to Lowe’s Yahalom protocol. 
The first step towards the composition of these 
protocols consists in verifying the „key-secrecy 
independence” security requirement formulated by the 
authors in [17]. To achieve this, we specify the secret 
terms for the two involved protocols. For the first protocol, 
these are no secret terms, while the secret terms for the 
second protocol are { },b ABN K  (we consider that 
participant names are public). 
 
 
 
 
            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Woo and Lam Pi3 representation in the k-strand space model 
 
 
            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Lowe’s modified version of Yahalom’s representation in the k-
strand space model 
 
Because ( ) :k bt sentTerms N tς∃ ∈ ≺  and t is not 
encrypted, the first requirement is not satisfied. To allow 
the composition of the two protocols, Nb in the first 
protocol must be different from Nb  in the second protocol. 
We emphasize this aspect by replacing Nb with bN ′  in kς ′ . 
Because of space considerations, we only construct 
complete connections which play a crucial role in the 
composition process. In protocol kς  we have only one 
complete connection:  
{ } ( ) { } ( )
{ } ( ) { } ( ){ } ( )
, ,
, , ,
AS AS
AS AS
AS
b b kA Csk K sk K
b b kBsk K sk K
sk K
N N s
N A N s
+
+

 
Because of term structure varieties, in protocol kς ′  there 
are no complete connections. By using the steps described 
in section IV.B we generate all possible sequences of 
protocols, resulting a total number of 1683 protocols. After 
filtering protocols for which concatenated terms have 
different source-destination participants, there remain a 
total number of 408 protocols. For each protocol we can 
apply the term composition algorithm, resulting a new set 
of protocols. One of the resulting protocols is shown in 
Fig. 4. In order to select the most performant protocols, we 
can apply the „minimum number of messages” principle, 
 
{ }, , , , ,a ASA A B S N K  
 
 
 
 
 
 
{ }, , , , ,b BSB A B S N K  
, aA N  
 
, , , ,
,
,
AB
AS BS
A B S K
S
K K
 
 
 
 
{ } ( ), BSAB sk KA K  
 
 
 
{ } ( ), , BSa b sk KA N N  
{ } ( ), , , ASAB a b sk KB K N N  
 
 
{ } ( ), , , ABb sk KA B S N  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
{ }, , , , ,b BSB A B S N K  { }, , , , ASA A B S K  
A  
bN  
{ } ( )ASb sk KN
 
  
{ }, , , , ,AS BSS A B S K K  { } ( ){ } ( ), AS BSb sk K sk KA N
 
{ } ( ), BSb sk KA N  
  
            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Composed protocol 
 
or we can construct a performance evaluation method, 
which we consider to be part of future work. 
As we can see from Fig. 4, the complete connection is 
also maintained in the composed protocol. In addition, the 
second security requirement formulated by the authors in  
[17], i.e. “message independence”, is also satisfied 
because messages have different cryptographical 
structures. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
In this paper we proposed a method for composing se-
curity protocol terms. To define security properties em-
bedded in protocols we introduced the concept of partial 
and complete connections. Our approach modifies terms 
only in the sense of extending them with new components, 
thus preserving partial connections. Complete connections 
are maintained by modifying all subsequent terms depend-
ent of the modified term. 
As future work, we intend to extend the proposed term 
composition algorithm with performance-related informa-
tion. This would give users the possibility to choose the 
best suited protocol for a given environment. However, 
this is rather difficult to achieve based only on informal 
specifications. This is why we intend to construct a per-
formance evaluation model that allows us to compare pro-
tocol performance rather than giving an exact behavior in 
a specific environment. 
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